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The Role of MERCOSUR as a Vehicle for Latin
American Integration
Samuel A. Arieti*
I. INTRODUCTION
In early July 2004, the foreign and economic ministers of the four member
states of the Common Market of the Southern Cone ("MERCOSUR")
convened in Puerto Iguazu, Argentina, for the twenty-sixth meeting of the
economic integration organization's most powerful institutional body, the
Council of the Common Market ("CMC"). 1 To a large extent, the exhilarating
optimism and flowery rhetoric at the convention seemed characteristically
hollow, considering that the common market has yet to achieve its first and
most basic goal of establishing a common external tariff and that MERCOSUR's
two largest members, Argentina and Brazil, were locked in a bitter trade dispute
over the dumping of Brazilian exports. However, in a showing of interest and
solidarity that highlights the recent reenergizing and politicization of the
integration process in Latin America since the close of the 2003 talks for the
Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA"), the summit also drew the
attendance of the presidents of MERCOSUR's four member states (Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), as well as leaders from MERCOSUR's associate
states (Bolivia, Chile, and Peru), the presidents of Mexico and Venezuela, and
representatives from other nations in the region and from around the world.2
Following its potentially momentous acceptance of Venezuela as the
common market's fourth associated state,3 and with the future expansion of
BA 2003, The University of Virginia; JD Candidate 2006, The University of Chicago.
I MERCOSUR's member states include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. See
MERCOSUR CMC Act No 01/04, XXVI Reuni6n del Consejo del Mercado Comtn (July 8,
2004), available online at <http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/sdyd/actas/cmc/2004/ACTA
%2026%20CMC%20-%20final.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005).
2 Mercosurya Cuenta con un Tribunal Pemanente, La Rep6blica (Uruguay) (Aug 14, 2004).
3 See Modesto Emilio Guerrero, Venezuela's Triumph in Mercosur, (July 9, 2004), available online at
<http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1214> (visited Oct 27, 2005). See also
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MERCOSUR clearly on its mind, the CMC enacted Decision 18/04 ("Decision
18/04" or "Decision"), which implements a structure whereby associate states
can participate in the organizational institutions of MERCOSUR that were
formerly accessible only to the four member states.4 This initiative might dispel
criticism that the common market lacks the ability to expand beyond its initial
members, and given the incredible enthusiasm for regional interdependence that
has swept like-minded, progressive presidents into power across the continent,
Decision 18/04 might also reveal that the winds of change might at last be
blowing in favor of the full integration of Latin America first envisioned by
Simon Bolivar.
Other events also suggest that a MERCOSUR with coherent expansion
procedures might be the best mechanism for bringing that revolutionary vision
of integration into reality. In mid-October, MERCOSUR and the Andean
Community of Nations ("CAN") finalized a free trade agreement which
effectively includes Brazil and all of the Spanish-speaking nations in South
America except for Chile.5 Only ten days later, the former Argentine president
and current chairman of MERCOSUR's representative council, Eduardo
Duhalde, announced the December scheduling of a presidential summit to
discuss the political and economic incorporation of MERCOSUR, CAN, and
possibly Chile, into a South American Community of Nations ("CSN").6 Since
those meetings occurred, Ecuador and Colombia have been formally granted
status as associate states in MERCOSUR and the bloc has passed other
Modesto Emilio Guerrero, Venezuela and Aqgenfina Can Change Mercosur, (Apr 30, 2004), available
online at <http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?armo=l 166> (visited Oct 27, 2005).
4 MERCOSUR CMC Decision No 18/04, Regimen de Participaci6n de los Estados Asociados al
MERCOSUR (July 7, 2004), available online at <http://www.puntofocal.gov.ar/arch_
mercosur-sgt3/decision_cmc_l 8_04_estadosasociados.pdf> (visited Nov 22, 2005).
5 ALADI Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 56, Acuerdo de Complementaci6n
Econ6mica, CAN-MERCOSUR (Dec 6, 2002), available online at <http://www.mercosur-
comisec.gub.uy/INDEX-Comisec/Mercosur/Basicos/Acuerdos/ComAndina/CamMERCOSU
R61202.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005). See also REGION: CAN, Mercosur Seal FTA,
latinnews.com (Oct 19, 2004), available online at <http://62.173.71.58/asiaint/ln/ldb/LDB4659.
asp?instance=9&search=mercosur> (visited Oct 27, 2005). The member states of CAN include
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. All the members of CAN have since become
associate states of MERCOSUR.
6 Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones Nacerd en Cusco el 9 de Diiembre, (Oct 29, 2004), available online
at <http://www.perunoticias.net/modules/news/article.php?storyid=2166> (visited Oct 27,
2005).
7 See MERCOSUR CMC Decision No 42/04, Atribuci6n a la Reptiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela
de Condici6n de Estado Asociado del MERCOSUR (Dec 16, 2004), available online at
<http:/ /www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/normativa/decisiones/2004/DEC% 2 0 0 4 2 -004-
Est/o20Asoc /20Venezuela-ESActa%202-04.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005); MERCOSUR CMC
Decision No 43/04, Atribuci6n a la Reptiblica del Ecuador de la Condici6n de Estado Asociado
del MERCOSUR (Dec 16, 2004), available online at <http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/
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measures that signify that it no longer views itself as a mere four-member
customs union.8
Should any of these integration measures, including the CSN, be put into
effect, the MERCOSUR member states, especially Argentina and Brazil, would
play a primary role. Taking into consideration the bloc's economic successes and
the relative strengths of its institutional structures and arbitration system, an
entity along the lines of the CSN very well could be created by simply
developing MERCOSUR's framework for expansion. In this regard, Decision
18/04 shows that the CMC is considering a clear program for advancing
associate states' influence within MERCOSUR, and the act is a small but critical
step toward the sort of active and participatory role in decision-making that
would mark full and legitimate membership in a more politicaly orientated
common market. Nevertheless, Decision 18/04 falls short of representing a
wholly new identity for MERCOSUR because it leaves in place the group's
original customs union structure. By attempting to balance the member states'
economic accomplishments and the region's current political aspirations,
Decision 18/04 is perhaps best viewed as a significant, albeit hesitant, first step
towards greater regional integration.
This Development examines the scope of MERCOSUR's expansion and
analyzes the extent to which Decision 18/04 of the CMC represents meaningful
change in MERCOSUR's procedures for incorporating new members. Section 1I
will address the history of MERCOSUR's growth leading up to the CMC's
summits in July and December 2004, at Puerto Iguazu, Argentina, and at Ouro
Preto, Brazil. Section III will evaluate the substance of Decision 18/04 and what
effect it is likely to have for current associate states and for other nations seeking
membership. Section IV will briefly discuss the Decision 18/04 in terms of the
direction of the integration process in Latin America.
snor/normativa/decisiones/2004/DEC%20043-004-Est%20Asoc%20Ecuador-ESActa%202-
04.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005); MERCOSUR CMC Decision No 44/04, Atribuci6n a la
Repiblica de Colombia de la Condici6n de Estado Asociado del MERCOSUR (Dec 16, 2004),
available online at <http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/normativa/decisiones/2004/
DEC%20044-004-Est/o2OAsoc/ 20Col/sF4mbia-ESActa/202-04.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005)
(attributing the condition of associate state to Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia, respectively).
At its recent December meeting, for example, the CMC passed measures that would implement a
MERCOSUR parliament by the year 2006. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision No 49/04,
Parlamento del MERCOSUR (Dec 16, 2004), available online at <http://www.mercosur.org.uy
/espanol/snor/normativa/decisiones/2004/DEC%20049-004-Parlamento ESActa%202-04
.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005).
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II. MERCOSUR's STALLED EXPANSION AND GRAND VISION
OF THE FUTURE
In March 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay acceded to the
Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the
Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, and the Eastern
Republic of Uruguay, creating MERCOSUR.9 Supplemented by the Additional
Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur, 0
the Treaty of Asuncion states that the goals of MERCOSUR are to eliminate
trade barriers, establish a common external tariff, coordinate macroeconomic
policies, and develop the harmonization of laws." Initially, MERCOSUR was a
resounding success. An economic union of the four nations seemed logical.
Linked geographically, these countries already depended upon one another for
trade and had little overlap between their respective economies. 2 Economic
integration was to be achieved slowly through decisions made by various
temporary and ad hoc institutions and by the subsequent ratification of those
decisions by the respective legislatures of the member states. 3  The
MERCOSUR institutions themselves, including the arbitral panel for dispute
resolution, were to exercise little coercive power over the members and were not
to be the guiding force behind integration. 4 Instead, member states retained
control over economic progress through their representatives sitting on the
various MERCOSUR institutional committees. The effect of such retention of
control by the member states has been to repeatedly subject the integration
process to changes in the political climate of one or more of the member states.
Thus, during the recent economic meltdowns of Brazil and later Argentina,
MERCOSUR's integration process was stalled.
But despite this sense of reluctance to cede political sovereignty, the history
of MERCOSUR's expansion also reflects the desire to gain the benefits of
economic integration. Following the successes of the common market's
booming early years in the mid-nineties, Chile and Bolivia gained the status of
associate states by entering into economic complementation agreements with
9 Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic
of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay (1991), 30 ILM 1044
(hereinafter Treaty of Asuncion).
10 Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur (1994),
34 ILM 1248 (1995) (hereinafter Protocol of Ouro Preto).
11 Treaty of Asuncion, art 1 (cited in note 9).
12 See Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., MERCOSUR. The Common Market of the Twenty-First Centuy?, 32
GaJ Ind & Comp L 1, 7-9 (2004).
13 See generally Protocol of Ouro Preto (cited in note 10).
14 Porrata-Doria, 32 GaJ Intl & Comp L at 18 (cited in note 12).
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MERCOSUR in 1996."s Peru became MERCOSUR's third associate state
through a similar treaty in 2003.16 The terms of the agreements call for the
creation of free trade areas within fixed periods and for increases in various
forms of cooperation and investment."7
Because neither the Treaty of Asuncion nor the Ouro Preto Protocol
contemplated the expansion of MERCOSUR's membership, the common
market lacks formal procedures for admitting new members. Therefore, instead
of incorporating Bolivia, Chile, and Peru directly into its existing institutions,
which would have required a major overhaul of its foundations, MERCOSUR
chose to grant its associates indirect relationships through the mechanisms of
the Latin American Integration Association ("ALADI")."8 By forging bilateral
associations with MERCOSUR rather than joining it, the associate states were
able to maximize their independence from the group while still gaining increased
access to trade. Meanwhile, the member states of MERCOSUR were able to
preserve the distinct nucleus of the common market and the pace of their
common reforms.
Practically speaking, the associate states of MERCOSUR are not members
of the common market in any real sense. They possess little authority to
participate in the decisions and meetings of MERCOSUR's institutional bodies,
and they are not bound by those decisions or even by the broad MERCOSUR
policies outlined in the Treaty of Asuncion and in the Ouro Preto Protocol. 9
15 ALADI Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 35, Acuerdo de Complementaci6n
Econ6mica, MERCOSUR-Chile (june 25, 1996), available online at <http://www.
mercosur-comisec.gub.uy/INDEX-Co-isec/Mercosur/Basicos/Acuerdos/Chile/AcChie.htm>
(visited Oct 27, 2005); ALADI Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 36, Acuerdo de
Complementaci6n Econ6mica, MERCOSUR-Bol (Dec 17, 1996), available online at <http://
www.mercosur-comisec.gub.uy/INDEX-Comisec/Mercosur/Basicos/Acuerdos/Bolivia/
Acbolivia.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005).
16 ALADI Acuerdo de Complementad6n Econ6mica No 58, Acuerdo de Complementaci6n
Econ6mica, MERCOSUR-Peru (Aug 25, 2003), available online at <http://www.iadb.org/intal/
tratados/mercosur-perul.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005).
17 See ALADI Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 35, art 1 (cited in note 15); ALADI
Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 36, art 1 (cited in note 15); ALADI Acuerdo de
Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 58, art 1 (cited in note 16).
18 Latin American nations established ALADI in 1980 in order to set up the framework for regional
treaties aimed at gradually harmonizing economic policy. The organization has mainly served to
facilitate bilateral economic agreements between various states. See generally ALADI, available
online at <http://www.aladi.org/nsfweb/redisenioSitio/index.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005).
19 Chile was granted limited rights to participate in MERCOSUR in 1997 during failed discussions
to integrate itself fully into MERCOSUR. See MERCOSUR CMC Decision No 12/97,
Parficipacidn de Chile en Reuniones del MERCOSUR (Dec 15, 1997), available online at
<http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/normativa/decisiones/1997/9712.htm> (visited
Oct 27, 2005). In 2003, during the reenergizing of integration efforts, the CMC granted Bolivia
and Peru limited rights of participation in a decision overturned by Decision 18/04. See
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Instead, the associate states' relationships with the common market are governed
by commissions representing both parties that work to fulfill the obligations of
the respective economic complementation agreements. ° Because the associate
states cede no control to a supranational MERCOSUR entity, they are free to
pursue alternative economic arrangements as seem politically expedient. One
such example was Chile's decision to enter into a free trade agreement with the
United States in June 2003,21 which effectively blocked the likelihood of its full
incorporation into MERCOSUR. Additionally, the agreements signed between
MERCOSUR and its associate states are merely bilateral arrangements-nothing
ensures the deepening of an economic relationship among the various associate
states themselves in a way which might suggest broader regional integration. As
it stood before the Puerto Iguazu summit, MERCOSUR's expansion process
seemed to be particularly vulnerable to changes in the political climate and was
severely clouded by doubts concerning the member states' commitment to
expand the economic integration organization beyond its original membership.
The recent entries of Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela as the fourth,
fifth, and sixth associate states of the common market do little to allay these
concerns because those nations also joined MERCOSUR through an ALADI
agreement.22 Nevertheless, recent political conditions in South America favoring
regional cooperation have produced the widespread expectation that
MERCOSUR nations will lead the way towards total regional integration.
Regional unity has become a centerpiece of foreign and domestic agendas for
MERCOSUR CMC Decision No 38/03, Participadn de Bolivia en Reuniones del Mercosur (Dec 15,
2003), available online at <http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/normativa/decisiones/
2003/Dec 038 003.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005); MERCOSUR CMC Decision No 39/03,
Partipadn de la Repeiblica de Peru en Reuniones del Mercosur (Dec 15, 2003), available online at
<http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espanol/snor/nornativa/decisiones/2003/Dec-039 003.htm>
(visited Oct 27, 2005).
20 See ALADI Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 35, art 46 (cited in note 15); ALADI
Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 36, art 39 (cited in note 15); ALADI Acuerdo de
Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 58, arts 36-37 (cited in note 16).
21 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (June 6, 2003), available online at <http://
www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/FinaLTexts/Section-Index.html>
(visited Oct 27, 2005).
22 See ALADI Acuerdo de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 56 (cited in note 5). See also Acuerdo
de Alcance Parcial de Complementaci6n Econ6mica No 59, Acuerdo de Complementaci6n
Econ6mica Suscrito entre los Gobiernos de la Repiblica Argentina, de la Rep6blica Federativa
del Brasil, de la Repiblica del Paraguay y de la Reptiblica Oriental del Uruguay, Estados Partes del
MERCOSUR y los Gobiernos de la Reptblica de Colombia, de la Reptiblica del Ecuador y de la
Reptiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela, Paises Miembros de la Comunidad Andina, available online
at <http://www.aladi.org/nsfaladi/textacdos.nsf/inicio2004?OpenFrameSet&Frame=basefrm&
Src=_d5tn76pj1dhm8q9fehingt31 cdi6uspedppmcbrkcls78ob3chnn6chy60q3uircln50ob7cki42t
bkdt374obdci00_> (visited Oct 27, 2005); Cumbre Mercosur-Venezuela Ingresa al Bloque como Estado
Asodado: ElMercosurAmplia su Membresiay Gana en Presencia, La Repfiblica (Uruguay) (July 9, 2004).
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not only the leaders of MERCOSUR-Brazilian President Luis Ignacio Lula da
Silva and his Argentine counterpart, President Nestor Kirchner-but also for
nearly all the leaders from around the continent.23 A revived MERCOSUR
played the role of a vital bargaining chip in Argentina and Brazil's negotiations
with the United States during the Bush Administration's FTAA talks in Cancun
and Miami in late 2003, and MERCOSUR has emerged from the Miami summit
as a leader of sorts for Latin American nations disillusioned with US policies in
the hemisphere.24 The attendance of the Puerto Iguazu summit by so many
regional leaders devoted to a new sort of sweeping integration illustrates that the
genuine expansion of MERCOSUR has become a powerful vision backed across
many fronts by popular support, capital resources, and sincere political
commitment. Pressures associated with this new reality were clearly behind the
CMC's decision to open up MERCOSUR's institutions to participation by
nations with which it has signed ALADI accords.
Decision 18/04 marks the beginning of the CMC's efforts to create
internal mechanisms capable of admitting states into the group and developing
those associate states into full-fledged members of the common market.
Therefore, while negotiations continue in pursuit of a new economic integration
organization (CSN) through a merger of MERCOSUR and CAN,25 Decision
18/04 might make available another option for regional integration: continental
integration through expanding the internal apparatus of MERCOSUR itself.
This option would be preferred by MERCOSUR's associate states, considering
the strength of MERCOSUR institutions, and it would also be advantageous to
the common market's member states because it would not immediately interrupt
the harmonization policies that they have enacted to date. However, questions
remain concerning whether a four-nation economic integration organization
established as a customs union could really be the best model for Latin
American integration, given that such integration efforts most likely will proceed
along political-not economic-grounds.
23 Tabare Vazquez, the President of Uruguay, has gone as far as to recommend the subordination of
his nation's armed forces to a MERCOSUR army. See URUGUAY: VaqueZ Maintains Narrow
Advantage, latinnews.com (Sept 28, 2004), available online at <http://www.latinnews.com/
lrbs/LRBS4492.asp?instance=6> (visited Oct 27, 2005).
24 See, for example, Dr. Mario E. Carranza, MERCOSUR, The Free Trade Area of the Ameicas, and the
Future of U.S. Hegemony in Lain Amefica, 27 Fordham Intl L J 1029 (2004).
25 By virtue of the Economic Complementation Agreement between MERCOSUR and CAN, CAN
member states Colombia and Ecuador were formally admitted into MERCOSUR as associate
states during the CMC's December 2004 summit at Ouro Preto, Brazil. Decision 18/04 governs
these nations' role within MERCOSUR. See notes 5 and 7.
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III. DECISION 18/04: PARTICIPATORY REGIME FOR
MERCOSUR's ASSOCIATE STATES
The principal goals of Decision 18/04 are to intensify regional integration
and to deepen and formalize MERCOSUR's relationships with the nations, or
associate states, with which it has signed ALADI agreements.26 The CMC seeks
to accomplish those goals by "creating conditions for the association of the
ALADI states with MERCOSUR and by regulating those states' participation in
the meetings of the bodies of MERCOSUR's institutional structure. '27 In Article
1 of Decision 18/04, the CMC confers the formal status of "Estado Asociado"
or associate state upon any ALADI nation which has signed a free trade
agreement with MERCOSUR.28 Decision 18/04 then briefly outlines the steps
that interested nations should take to apply to the CMC for status as associate
states.29 The key article in Decision 18/04 is Article 4, which grants associate
states the right to participate in MERCOSUR's institutions.3 ° The nations that
have already ratified ALADI agreements with MERCOSUR are granted
immediate access to meetings. Articles 5 and 6 discuss the limitations on the
associate states' rights to participate in MERCOSUR.3 Article 11 sets forth the
goal of improving the mediation of agreements between MERCOSUR and its
associate states before the next annual summit of the CMC.
3 2
There are a number of important things to note about Decision 18/04.
First, and most importantly, it extends the possibility of admission into
MERCOSUR to every ALADI state, provided that the state ratify an economic
complementation agreement and comply with basic democratic principles set
forth in earlier MERCOSUR treaties. The Decision's primary goal is to secure
regional integration, while the expansion of MERCOSUR's relationships with
the nations with which it already has signed ALADI agreements remains a
secondary goal. Therefore, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru are not granted a status
superior to that enjoyed by any nation, like Colombia, Ecuador, or Venezuela,
that later becomes an associate state. Instead, the CMC clearly intends Decision
18/04 to function as an invitation to states not currently affiliated with
26 See Decision 18/04 (cited in note 4).
27 See id at preamble (author's own translation).
28 Id at art 1. In the cases of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Columbia, the MERCOSUR-CAN agreement
suffices. See Decision 42/04, art 1 (Venezuela) (cited in note 7); Decision 43/04, art 1 (Ecuador)
(cited in note 7); Decision 44/04, art 1 (Colombia) (cited in note 7).
29 See Decision 18/04, arts 2-3 (cited in note 4). Such interested nations likely include Mexico and
Panama.
30 Id art 4.
31 Id at arts 5-6.
32 Id at art 11.
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MERCOSUR. The openness of potential membership underscores
MERCOSUR's readiness, backed by popular and political pressure, to expand
beyond the Southern Cone into a continental, or even a hemispheric,
organization.
Second, although an associate state can still be admitted into MERCOSUR
through ALADI, its relationship with the common market does not seem
limited to the strict content of an economic complementation agreement
because it will have ongoing participatory rights in MERCOSUR proceedings. In
contrast with prior decisions that granted Bolivia and Peru some rights to
participate only in MERCOSUR meetings expressly relevant to the content of
their respective economic complementation agreements, Decision 18/04 makes
no mention of any limitation concerning the content of the proceedings to
which an associate state may gain access.33 Moreover, Article 11 discusses the
intent of the CMC to develop new mechanisms to regulate MERCOSUR's
changing relationship with its associate states. 4 Implicitly, it seems that Decision
18/04 may be only the first of a series of acts through which the CMC hopes to
change the status of the associate states to that of bilateral partners with
MERCOSUR into that of members of a broader, fully-integrated group.
Third, the Decision does not guarantee associate states unreserved access
to MERCOSUR proceedings. Indeed, Articles 5 and 6 contemplate the
limitations to the role that associate states will play in MERCOSUR's internal
deliberations. Article 5 states that "the participation of the Associated States in
each meeting will be granted by invitation from the appropriate MERCOSUR
body or as an answer to a request from the Associated State."3 Associate states
receive unrestricted access only to MERCOSUR's nonbinding consultative
group. In order to attend the meetings of more important institutions, such as
the CMC, the associate state must first seek approval from the representatives of
the four member states. Then, under Article 6, the meeting of the institutional
body is divided into two sessions, the first session being open only to the four
member states.36 In short, the formal mechanisms created to allow participation
of associate states are subject to the ad hoc approval of the member states
themselves. In a sense, this does little to advance integration within the bloc
because it is likely that if the member states desired the presence of the associate
33 See Decision 38/03 (cited in note 19); Decision 39/03 (cited in note 19).
34 Decision 18/04 suggests that the CMC desires to create a common MERCOSUR policy regarding
all of its associate states, rather than treat each state independently, according to the terms of the
bilateral ALADI treaty with the common market. See art 11 (cited in note 4).
35 Id at art 5 (author's own translation).
36 Id at art 6.
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states at any given MERCOSUR meeting, they could always extend an invitation
to those nations.
On the other hand, by allowing the associate states to petition for inclusion
in any MERCOSUR proceeding, Decision 18/04 basically guarantees that as
long as the present enthusiasm towards integration persists, the associate states
will have access to most proceedings. Despite the limitations to access contained
in Articles 5 and 6, Article 4 sets forth a presumption of an associate state's right
to participate in any of MERCOSUR's institutional meetings. Assuming that an
associate state requests access to a proceeding, it will receive access as an invitee.
Then, the four member states will have two options: they can either use their
veto power to deny the associate state's access altogether (it is not clear if the
four member states' representatives to a given institution have to vote
unanimously) or they can admit the associate state but choose to hold the
meeting in two sessions, allowing access only to the second session. In effect,
the right to hold meetings in two sessions acts as a disincentive to the member
states' use of their veto power to restrict associate states' general access to
meetings. Member states opposing the participation of an associate state in a
certain area will achieve the same exclusionary effect whether they restrict access
completely or allow access to a second (and second-hand) session, at which
point not all the same topics are broached. Allowing an associate state access to
a second session may also emerge as a compromise between two member states
that disagree on whether to include or exclude an associate state.
In fact, the limitation on the access granted to associate states can be
viewed best not as a failure of Decision 18/04, but rather in light of the member
states' concerns with opening up MERCOSUR to undefined expansion. While
immediate transition from a four-nation common market into a regional political
and economic entity along the lines of the European Union would certainly
create dramatic integration in Latin America, such a rapid alteration in the
framework of MERCOSUR would jeopardize its accomplishments to date.
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay already have enacted a series of
common reforms and harmonization measures that have caused them to creep
slowly, but steadily, towards creating the market, or customs union, enunciated
in the Treaty of Asuncion. Any radical change to MERCOSUR's internal
structure could pose a challenge to the complicated network of obligations
established to date and could even require the dismantling of the entire regime
set up by the Treaty of Asuncion. Allowing the participation in MERCOSUR of
any nation affiliated with ALADI creates substantial uncertainty, as well as the
potential that member states will lose control over the direction in which the
common market is heading.
VoL 6 No. 2
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Therefore, while in the past, the CMC was willing to grant unreserved
access to consultative sessions to associate states such as Bolivia and Peru,3"
nations with which MERCOSUR had carefully signed individual ALADI
accords, Decision 18/04 actually restricts those states' formal access to such
sessions. Member states are not expected to use their veto power to prevent
entry to such proceedings by Bolivia and Peru, but they clearly did not want to
guarantee similar access to any ALADI nation that might become accepted as an
associate state. By extending the possibility of associate state status to any
ALADI nation, Decision 18/04 might be too invitational because the CMC felt
the need to impose what could be interpreted as quite severe restrictions on the
role formally granted to admitted associate states. The gamble is that many
ALADI nations will see inclusion in the common market as only a first step to
wider participation in the group, and thus will not be deterred from applying for
membership by questions concerning the role of associate states.
The limitations imposed on the associate states' access also illustrate that
the image of MERCOSUR sketched at Asuncion in 1991 has not yet been
rejected in favor of a new common market that would include most other South
American nations. Instead, Decision 18/04 shows that the current vision of
regional integration will have to coexist alongside the four-nation common
market created by earlier treaties. Rather than immediately opening up
MERCOSUR's full membership to other nations, the member states have
chosen to create a two-tiered system through which other nations seeking
admission will first gain status as associate states and then harmonize slowly with
the core group at the pace set by an economic complementation agreement. Full
integration of an associate state could be achieved on such a bilateral basis, with
the individual state eventually coming into line with MERCOSUR's
requirements and then being granted status as a full member state. Article 11,
however, suggests that the CMC's goal for the next year is to change
MERCOSUR's relationship from that of a bilateral partnership with each
associate state in favor of a broader, self-sustained relationship with all of its
associates. In this regard, the probable approach will be to create a second high-
profile organization like the CMC that consists of representatives from all states
affiliated with MERCOSUR. 8 Such an organization could prove effective at
devising common integration measures, and it would certainly be an
improvement over the bilateral commissions that currently monitor the progress
37 See Decision 38/03, art 3 (Bolivia) (cited in note 19); Decision 39/03, art 3 (Peru) (cited in note
19).
38 In fact, by recommending the creation of a MERCOSUR Parliament by 2006, the CMC may have
done exacdy this, even though current plans call for the Parliament to consist only of
representatives from the four member states. See Decision 49/04 (cited in note 8).
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of an associate state in terms of its ALADI accord. A better alternative would be
for MERCOSUR to follow the European model by creating a supranational
entity charged with directing the policies of integration. Given member states'
reluctance to cede sovereignty to the group, this option may not seem viable at
the moment. Nevertheless, the recent creation of MERCOSUR's second
supranational entity, the Permanent Review Tribunal, implies that nations in the
region are finally committed to making the tough compromises associated with
creating real economic and political union."
IV. CONCLUSION
Decision 18/04 creates a system of expansion that facilitates admission
into MERCOSUR and allows for substantial deepening of bilateral relations
between an admitted state and the common market, but falls short of outlining
the steps necessary for the granting of full membership. Nevertheless, the
Decision marks the first time that the common market has addressed a policy of
expansion, and political resolve that further integration will be good for Latin
America is likely to ensure that Decision 18/04 will be followed upon by
subsequent acts. If the CMC's future decisions create formal institutions to
direct relations with associate states, then MERCOSUR's framework for
expansion will be strong and attractive enough to sustain considerable growth.
Moreover, a practical effect of the Decision is that if talks for a CSN get off the
ground following the discussions of the past winter, the idea of creating a
continental economic integration organization through expanding
MERCOSUR's membership remains a distinct possibility.
The development of MERCOSUR into a more significant union of states
ultimately remains an issue susceptible to shifts in the political arena. Latin
American states must ask themselves if they really want or need continental
integration and whether MERCOSUR, the imperfect customs union that it is,
could be the proper vehicle to achieve it. The weaknesses in the system
established by Decision 18/04 reflect the primary dilemma facing the bloc today:
Is it a four-nation customs union or a nucleus of a future South American
Community of Nations? The Decision ultimately comes out in favor of the first
view of MERCOSUR because its two-tiered approach safeguards the carefully
hewn relationships among member states, built under the framework of the
39 At the Puerto Iguazu summit, the CMC created a permanent arbitration panel headquartered in
Asuncion as a final authority governing disputes arising among the member states. MERCOSUR
CMC Decision No 26, Designaci6n de los Arbitros del Tribunal Permanente de Revisi6n del
MERCOSUR (July 7, 2004), available online at <http://www.mercosur-comisec.gub.uy/INDEX-
Comisec/Mercosur/Basicos/Documentos/PdeOlivos/Dec2604.htm> (visited Oct 27, 2005). See
also Porrata-Doria, 32 Ga J Intl & Comp L at 69-70 (cited in note 12) (discussing the importance
of a supranational institution as a guide towards integration).
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Treaty of Asuncion-sacrificing a more active role of the associate states in
order to preserve the basic model of a pre-existing four-nation customs union.
Nevertheless, the expansion of the common market is the principal factor
among many, which clearly shows that Latin America is contemplating a sort of
political union. Decision 18/04 demonstrates that, in the minds of many,
MERCOSUR's primary purpose is to bring that union into effect.
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